This study analyzes how commitment to a deficit ceiling can affect private agents' political efforts, as well as overall welfare, in a hard and a soft budget regime, using a two-period model simulating a present and a future generation and a government. In the hard budget regime, the government imposes the deficit ceiling before the present-generation's interest group decides the quantity of personal fiscal privileges. Since in the soft budget regime the government cannot commit itself to the deficit ceiling ex ante, the present generation exerts intense political efforts for personal fiscal privileges. We explore the interesting possibility that the soft budget regime leads to an overall welfare reduction for both generations, and hence, the commitment to a deficit ceiling benefits even rent-seeking private agents.
Introduction
In a situation of fiscal instability, it is important that target levels of deficit ceiling be determined. For example, the 27 member states of the European Union have agreed, under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), to facilitate and maintain the stability of the Economic and Monetary Union. As is well known, all member states must respect the following criteria: (1) an annual budget deficit no higher than 3% of GDP and (2) a national debt lower than 60% of GDP. However, following criticism regarding insufficient flexibility, the EU Council relaxed the rules in March 2005 and made the pact more enforceable as well. As a result, while the ceilings of 3% for the budget deficit and 60% for public debt remain, the decision to declare a country's deficit as excessive can now rely on certain parameters. The 2013 fiscal compact now defines a balanced budget as one with a general budget deficit of less than 3.0% of GDP, and a structural deficit of less than 1.0% of GDP if the debt-to-GDP ratio is significantly below 60% and of less than 0.5% of GDP otherwise. In Japan, a similar Fiscal Structural Reform Act was implemented in early 1997 to achieve consolidation targets similar to those of the EU. However, during the severe recession in late 1997, the Japanese government implemented expansionary fiscal measures due to political pressure from various interest groups. Thereafter, the Act was no longer regarded as a legal constraint.
These developments suggest the importance of commitment to a deficit ceiling in a political economy. The size of public deficit is endogenously determined within the political process, but is influenced by the community's privilege and consolidation activities. How long-term objectives should be modified to accommodate economic fluctuations and to maintain some flexibility with respect to a fiscal stabilization policy is a key issue, which I have investigated elsewhere (Ihori, 2013) . This study focuses on another important question: the welfare impact of the commitment to a deficit ceiling.
Specifically, the study examines, using a two-period model with two generations and a benevolent government, how the above commitment influences private agents' political efforts for more fiscal privileges in a simple political economy.
Fiscal consolidation is now well recognized as a public good, considering its role in improving the overall fiscal situation. Once a deficit ceiling is imposed, the fiscal situation improves with a decrease in fiscal privileges for private agents, resulting in an increase in useful public spending. Hence, as shown in Itaya (2002, 2004) , for example, the analytical framework for private provision of public goods, summarized by Cornes and Sandler (1996) , is useful for an examination of the outcome of fiscal reconstruction or consolidation. See also Velasco (2000) , for example.
This study explicitly incorporates the political efforts for fiscal privileges, which potentially hurt the fiscal situation, using a simple formulation of rent-seeking activities. For the standard analysis of rent-seeking activities, see Buchanan et al. (1980) and Congleton et al. (2008) , for example. The original literature suggests that resources are unproductively used in rent-seeking contests. My formulation is a very simple one, where private agents invest in wasteful political efforts rather than undertaking productive activity, although the contemporary literature on rent seeking has a much broader application than that of the initial rent-seeking studies.
Interest groups of the present generation seek fiscal privileges through political efforts, which would require the personal cost of giving up leisure. In addition, when a ceiling is imposed on fiscal deficits, an increase in fiscal privileges leads to a corresponding decrease in useful public goods; the interest groups may well recognize the additional cost of such decrease. In this simple formulation, the rent-seeking efforts are affected by political institutions and the government's behavior. It is also important that the model consider how the government imposes the deficit ceiling. This study considers a two-period model with a hard budget and a soft budget regime.
In the hard budget regime, the government imposes a deficit ceiling before the interest groups of the present generation decide the quantity of privileges they want. This is the commitment case where the government is politically strong enough to impose a deficit ceiling, though not to control fiscal privileges. In the soft budget regime, the government imposes the deficit ceiling after the interest groups of the present generation decide the fiscal privileges they want. This is the non-commitment case where a politically weak government cannot commit itself to a deficit ceiling ex ante. Janeba (2012) analyzed the costs and benefits of a credibly announced but lagged deficit or deficit ceiling rule in a political economy model. He showed that a constitutional limit on the future debt level is more effective than a balanced budget rule. He highlighted an interesting issue of delay in the commitment problem. The present study also investigates the intragenerational and intergenerational spillovers of the political efforts in both deficit ceiling regimes, but focuses on the welfare implications of commitment, instead. We compare the hard and soft budget outcomes in a political economy where private agents make rent-seeking political efforts. This study then explores a seemingly paradoxical outcome in the soft budget regime. For literature on the soft budget regime in a political economy, see Boadway and Tremblay (2006) and Ihori (2011) , for example.
In the soft budget game, when the deficit ceiling is determined after political efforts by the interest group, the government's loose response directly benefits the present generation, as expected, but hurts the future generation. Nevertheless, the increased privileges indirectly hurt the private agents by deteriorating the overall fiscal situation. In such a paradoxical case, the commitment to a deficit ceiling could benefit even the rent-seeking present generation as well as the future generation. This study explores not only the merits of a hard budget deficit ceiling but also some limitations of the political efforts for obtaining the privileges. It thus highlights the importance of the negative spillovers of political efforts and the commitment to a deficit ceiling in a political economy by explicitly comparing the hard and soft budget games.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we develop the basic analytical framework. In section 3, we investigate the hard budget outcome.
Section 4 examines the soft budget outcome of the non-commitment case. In section 5, we explore the policy implications of the timing of the deficit ceiling by comparing the soft and hard budget outcomes. Finally, we present our conclusions in section 6.
Analytical Framework: Fiscal Consolidation and Ceiling on Deficits
As stressed by Itaya (2002, 2004) , interest groups may accept the overall objective of fiscal consolidation although they do not agree with the process of its implementation. More objectively, this study focuses on the cost side of fiscal consolidation, the rent seeking for fiscal privileges. Once the government imposes a ceiling on fiscal deficits, an increase in fiscal privileges leads to a corresponding reduction in useful public goods, hurting welfare. Thus, the interest groups may have an incentive to cooperate with fiscal consolidation to some extent. Since improving the fiscal situation in this regime is in the nature of a public good, the analytical framework of private provision of public goods is useful in this analysis.
This study explicitly introduces a present and a future generation, as well as a benevolent government, in a two-period framework. Each generation lives for one period and has selfish preferences. Alternatively, we may regard the future generation as a proxy for the altruistic benevolent voters in period 1 (see section 4.3). Each generation consists of n identical agents, or interest groups. In order to incorporate the negative spillovers of fiscal privileges, we consider the non-cooperative behavior among various interest groups, and hence, n is assumed to be greater than 1. For simplicity, we do not consider the political behavior of the future generation.
The government's budget constraint for each period is given as
where i T is the exogenously given part of total tax revenue in period i (i = 1,2), Z is equal to zero.
The ceiling on fiscal deficits is denoted by D , which is imposed by the government in period 1. We assume that debt cannot be negative, 0 D  , and r is the exogenously given interest rate. In the commitment case, the government is politically strong enough to impose a deficit ceiling, though not to control the fiscal privileges directly. It follows that the government may impose a ceiling on the total spending,
G Z
 , but cannot control the distribution between G and Z. It is not easy for the government to control fiscal privileges such as wasteful public works directly.
Actually, many countries have recently imposed such a ceiling on total The utility function of private agent j in period i is given as
The utility of agent j in period i depends on private consumption, ij y , and the quantity of the useful public good, i G . Both private consumption and public goods are normal goods.
Substituting the budget constraints (1-1)(1-2) into the above utility function, the utility function of agent j in each period (i = 1, 2) may be rewritten as
)
The utility in period 1 depends on the amount of total fiscal privileges, Z1, as well as the quantity of private goods consumed, 1 j y .
The greater the political efforts by each agent of the present generation, the more are the privileges, and the higher is the income. Therefore, a simple but plausible formulation is that agent j 's production of overall disposable income is to some extent associated with a quantity of privileges, denoted by 1 j z , which is the outcome of political efforts. Thus, each agent's budget constraint in period 1 is given as
Here, the after-tax income, excluding fiscal privileges, 1 j w , is exogenously given. The overall disposable income includes fiscal privileges, 1 j z . To obtain 1 j z , we need some resources, the cost function of which can be summarized as
' m   , reflects the degree of efficiency of privilege activities. With a large '  , m could be negative. The lower m is, the larger are the political efforts needed to produce a given amount of privilege, and hence, the less economically efficient the political-effort technology. We do not consider bequests since the agent is selfish.
For the private agent in period 2, whose consumption is fixed, we have 2 2 j j y w  Since the agents are identical, we may omit the subscript j from now on.
Hard Budget Game
The structure of the hard budget game is as follows. In the first stage, the government imposes a deficit ceiling. In the second stage, the present generation in period 1 makes political efforts to obtain fiscal privileges. First, we show that the weaker the deficit ceiling, the greater the political efforts by the present generation's interest groups. Likewise, the lower the disposable income, or the higher the tax levels, the greater the political efforts by these interest groups. The government may depress the political efforts by lowering the deficit ceiling. We then show that the government may set the optimal deficit ceiling either at zero or at a positive level, depending on the size of the negative spillovers of political efforts. The optimal deficit ceiling at an interior solution decreases with the interest rate but increases with the discount rate.
Second Stage
We first consider the optimizing behavior of the present generation's interest group in period 1. The optimality condition with respect to 1 z is given as 
is high or the marginal utility of public goods ( G U ) is low, then the agent intensifies her political efforts to obtain large privileges. If m is high (i.e., the political-effort technology is extremely efficient), the agent may obtain large privileges.
The reaction function of 1 z is given as
where 
First Stage
The present value of the government budget constraint is given as
An increase in D corresponds to an increase in 1 G and a decrease in 2 G , benefiting the present generation while hurting the future generation.
How to specify the objective of the government is an important question. The objective function of the government is given as
where  is the discount rate. The benevolent government considers the welfare of the present and future generations. The government maximizes (7) by choosing 0 D  (effectively, 1 2 , G G ) subject to (6) and exogenously given 1 2 , T T , considering the response of private agents in period 1, given by reaction function (5).
Hence, the welfare effect of D is given as
From the envelope theorem, the effect of 1
However, the effect on 
When the direct effect is greater than the indirect effect in the first term, we have an interior solution of D > 0, where (8) equals zero. An increase in r or a decrease in  leads to a rise in the cost and, in turn, a decline in the optimal level of D , which appears over time as the smoothing condition of public spending.
Soft Budget

Second Stage
We next consider the soft budget game, which we have in the case of a deficit ceiling without commitment. Here, the optimal deficit ceiling increases with fiscal privileges. This positive response stimulates the interest groups' political efforts to obtain more privileges. When fiscal consolidation is not quite credible, this game is more relevant than the hard budget game. In the 1990s, for example, many rural-based interest groups in Japan sought pork-barrel projects as part of their political efforts to obtain fiscal privileges. The Japanese government responded by raising the deficit ceiling (Doi and Ihori, 2009 ). The status of consolidation rules has changed over time in the EU as well, as explained by Nerlich and Reuter (2012) , and hence, the credibility of the rules is questionable.
The soft budget game is structured as follows. In the first stage, the present-generation interest group initiates political efforts to obtain fiscal privileges. In the second stage, the government determines the deficit level and debt issuance in period 1.
Let us first investigate the second-stage problem where the government chooses the deficit level to maximize social welfare (7) at the given level of 1 z . The optimality condition is given as
From (9), the reaction function of the government is given as (1 ) 1 
U n 
<0 in the right-hand side of (11). Since this negative term
reduces the marginal cost of obtaining 1 z , the right-hand side of (11), it stimulates 1 z more than it does in the hard budget game. This is an intuitively plausible result. increases, leading to a decline in useful public spending G1. Hence, they may also recognize that their political efforts reduce the public good G1. This is a simple formulation to incorporate political efforts in a fiscal consolidation issue. There could be many ways to model fiscal crises and fiscal consolidations in a political economy (e.g., Alesina and Tabellini, 1990; Auerbach, 2006 Auerbach, , 2009 Woo, 2005; Velasco, 2000) .
Benevolent Individuals and Altruistic Preferences
There might be benevolent individuals in the present generation. Suppose some individuals (n > 0) of the present generation are general voters and do not conduct political efforts but have altruistic preferences over the future generation.
y is their own consumption, and  is now the discount rate of altruistic preferences. Since their political effort is zero, 1k y is exogenously
given.
In such a formulation, the government must consider the welfare of benevolent voters, who would concern themselves about the future generation.
Hence, if politicians concern themselves only about rent-seeking interest groups, the resultant rent seeking would be of the highest degree. However, if politicians concern themselves only about purely benevolent agents, they would seek to maximize the welfare of benevolent voters. We may assume that the government would choose the optimal deficit ceiling based on the relative bargaining power  of interest groups and benevolent voters.
Now, 1 p y denotes the private consumption of rent-seeking individuals. Thus, we may qualitatively derive the same analytical results as in the text.
The government's Alternative Objective
Alternatively, we could assume that the government intends to maintain the given level of welfare for the future generation. In other words, 2 2
U U 
( 1 3 ) is the required condition. In such a case, since 2 G is fixed, the optimal deficit ceiling D is also fixed, and is independent of 1 z . Then, the soft budget outcome is identical to the hard budget outcome since we have As explained above, the soft budget game is characterized by more political effort than the hard budget game because of the loose government response in period 1.
The present generation normally benefits from an increase in personal privileges at the cost of the future generation.
An increase in political efforts by any agents of the present generation would hurt the other agents of the present generation by reducing G1. Interestingly, the welfare effect on the present generation becomes ambiguous if we consider the negative spillover effect on G1. If this negative spillover effect from the deteriorating fiscal situation outweighs the direct income effect achieved by the agent from an increase in her privilege, the income increase may hurt all agents of the present generation.
Paradoxically, the privilege increase could reduce the welfare of the present generation. Each agent receives a positive welfare effect only from her own increased privilege, even as she remains exposed to the negative welfare effect from the sum of all agents' additional privileges, resulting in a large decline in useful public goods. The number of interest groups of the present generation is important here since it corresponds to the magnitude of the negative spillover effect. With an increase in the number of rent-seeking agents, each of whom is more successful in increasing privileges than in fiscal consolidation, the aggregate privileges crowd out useful public goods.
Analytical Results
We now analytically explore the seemingly paradoxical outcome of a welfare ( 1 4 ) Substituting (14) into
we have
The sign is generally ambiguous but negative at the optimal level of 1 z . Substituting the first-order condition (4) into (16), we obtain
The sign of (17) is negative since n > 1. This is due to the negative spillover effect of an increase in 1 z on other agents in the present generation. This negative spillover effect hurts all the agents of the present generation. Then, we have (17) is larger than that of (18).
Adding up (17) and (18), we finally have 
When n is large, we may well have this case.
In case (ii) of We have assumed that G is a pure public good. Instead, let us now suppose that G is an impure public good. Then, we have 
may be rewritten as
For a small  , the magnitude of To sum up, the future generation definitely loses by the privilege increase in the soft budget game. In contrast, the privilege increase seemingly benefits the private agent of the present generation since she can enjoy more private consumption at the soft budget solution. This is a plausible conjecture. However, with a large number of agents, the damaging effect of a privilege increase on the fiscal situation might outweigh the positive income effect even for the present private agent. In such a paradoxical case, the rent-seeking present generation could also lose from excessive privileges in the soft budget game compared with the hard budget game. Hence, the hard budget outcome would be beneficial for the present private agent. This is because she cannot internalize negative spillovers due to the non-cooperative behavior of rent seeking. However, when interest groups cooperatively engage in political efforts, and thus, the negative spillover effect is internalized (n = 1), the soft budget outcome would be more beneficial for them. In this sense, the magnitude of negative spillovers may reflect the efficiency of political efforts.
Conclusion
For successful fiscal consolidation, a deficit increase must be in tune with fiscal consolidation. A deficit ceiling is an important and powerful tool. This study considered the political efforts of rent-seeking private agents and examined how the government imposes a deficit ceiling in a hard as well as a soft budget regime. When a fiscal deficit ceiling is employed, an increase in fiscal privileges results in a decrease in useful public goods. Each agent's fiscal privileges have negative spillovers of reducing useful public goods-by nature, bad for the public.
We first showed that the weaker the deficit ceiling, the greater is the amount of political efforts by the present generation. Likewise, the higher the amount of disposable income, or the lower the amount of tax, the lesser the political efforts by the present generation's interest groups. We also showed that the optimal level of deficit ceiling might be determined by an intertemporal smoothing condition of the pubic goods. In the hard budget regime, the government may set the optimal deficit ceiling at either zero or a positive level, depending on the magnitude of the negative spillovers of political efforts. The optimal level at an interior solution decreases with the interest rate, but increases with the discount rate.
We then showed that the commitment to a deficit ceiling is important.
Expectedly, the soft budget constraint without commitment stimulates fiscal privileges since the government reacts by raising the deficit ceiling when the rent-seeking present generation increases its political efforts. This positive response would produce a soft budget outcome since the present generation has an incentive to increase their political efforts. An increase in disposable income due to additional privileges in the soft budget game normally enhances welfare for the present generation. Although the present generation may prefer the soft budget game, it could be welfare deteriorating even for the present generation by depressing useful public goods. With a large number of interest groups, the commitment to a deficit ceiling in the hard budget game could benefit even the present generation. This paradoxical result occurs because non-cooperative rent-seeking behavior cannot internalize negative spillovers.
Recently, Janeba (2012) investigated the interesting outcome of constitutional constraints on future fiscal policy when voters and politicians disagree on the timing of government spending. He highlighted the importance of investigating delays in a fiscal consolidation problem. By contrast, we focused here on intra-generational and intergenerational spillovers of political efforts on fiscal consolidation. Our model is, admittedly, highly stylized and abstracts from several possible directions of generalization, such as game-theoretical analyses of political efforts and privileges in a dynamic framework, different formulations of fiscal consolidation, and the roles of bureaucrats and politicians. Nevertheless, we hope this study has highlighted the importance of efficiency in political efforts and commitment to a deficit ceiling in a political economy.
